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Despite the life-saving ability of antibiotics and their importance as a key enabler of all of modern health care, their
eﬀectiveness is now threatened by a rising tide of resistance. Unfortunately, the antibiotic pipeline does not match
health needs because of challenges in discovery and development, as well as the poor economics of antibiotics.
Discovery and development are being addressed by a range of public–private partnerships; however, correcting the
poor economics of antibiotics will need an overhaul of the present business model on a worldwide scale. Discussions
are now converging on delinking reward from antibiotic sales through prizes, milestone payments, or insurance-like
models in which innovation is rewarded with a ﬁxed series of payments of a predictable size. Rewarding all drugs
with the same payments could create perverse incentives to produce drugs that provide the least possible innovation.
Thus, we propose a payment model using a graded array of benchmarked rewards designed to encourage the
development of antibiotics with the greatest societal value, together with appropriate worldwide access to antibiotics
to maximise human health.

Introduction
Antibiotics have transformed modern medicine and
society, but the development of resistance is inevitable
with their use. Resistance is of particular concern as a
result of the weak development pipeline and the
emergence of strains for which there are few therapies.1,2
The causes of the thin pipeline are well understood:
the discovery of antibiotics is diﬃcult, clinical
development of antibiotics is constrained and costly, and
economic return on new antibiotics is generally poor.3–5
The ﬁrst two challenges are being addressed via
collaborative public–private partnerships6 and updates to
regulatory pathways.7–10 However, the economic challenge
of antibiotics is rooted in a fundamental tension between
the need for antibiotic conservation and the need for a
sales-based return on investment to recoup development
costs. New antibiotics are appropriately restricted from
use, thus lowering sales. This decrease in sales leads to a
low projected value and has reduced private antibiotic
investment.5,7,11–13
Furthermore, estimating the market for a novel
antibiotic is diﬃcult. For example, carbapenem-resistant
Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are one of three urgent
pathogens listed in the 2013 threat assessment produced
by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC);2 however, predicting the size of the market a
decade from now is a struggle for companies. For
example, the market in Sweden for such a drug eﬀective
against CRE is currently exceedingly small: the entire
country recorded only 94 cases of isolation of CRE
during 2007–13, with only 24 cases of symptomatic
infection.14 Furthermore, an entirely new drug might
not have been needed since 73% of the isolates were
susceptible to at least three classes of antibiotics. In the
USA, the CDC has estimated about 9000 clinical cases
of CRE per year,2 but many of these will be susceptible
to a few existing drugs. Thus, the actual number of CRE
cases per year in the USA requiring a new antibiotic is
likely to be less than 9000. If infection prevention eﬀorts

are successful, future trends would be even lower: the
US National Strategy projects a 60% decrease in CRE
infections in US hospitals by 2020.15 These reductions
are excellent public health targets but make the
commercial case even more daunting.

Addressing the economic challenge via a
delinked model
Breaking the link between sales volume and return on
investment is one possible approach to resolving the
tension between antibiotic stewardship and business
imperatives. Antibiotic delinkage pays companies on
some basis other than sales volume, such as value or
milestone-based payments. Delinkage could be implemented through payments of a predictable size and
duration after successful registration of a new qualifying
drug. Such payments would guarantee regulatory
maintenance of the drug (eg, initial registration,
maintenance of registration, pharmacovigilance, etc)
and continuity in the supply chain (manufacturing
base), whether the drug was prescribed or not.5,16,17

Calculation of the size of delinked payments
Economic models might be useful in estimating the size
of potential delinkage payments on the basis of
recovering research and development costs. One model
of net present value (NPV) of a new antibiotic transforms
a money-losing drug to one with an NPV of
US$300 million at the start of the research and development process through the promise of future payments of
$500 million per year for the ﬁrst 5 years after initial
registration.18 The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance19
commissioned in the UK estimates a range from
$2 billion to $4 billion for a full global patent buyout
(depending on discount rate, costs, and probabilities of
success), paid in a lump sum 3 years after registration. A
model prepared for the US Department of Health and
Human Services estimated that the US market for one
new antibiotic could be covered with cash payments over
www.thelancet.com/infection Vol 16 April 2016
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the product development cycle and at registration
totalling $919 million.11 These models make assumptions
that should be veriﬁed in a transparent process, and need
to account for the cost savings arising from government
support. However, they provide a useful starting point for
discussing buyout prices adequate to encourage work in
this specialty (table 1).
Nevertheless, it does not seem reasonable to assign
all antibiotics the same delinked reward. Experience
shows that the usefulness of antibiotics varies, with
some proving useful over time and others being
withdrawn for a range of reasons.20 New antibiotics
have historically been valued via marketing on the basis
of product diﬀerentiation. A manufacturer would be
motivated to select and develop candidate drugs that
are medically relevant, distinguishable from existing
drugs on the market, and hence commercially viable.
Additionally, a manufacturer is motivated to continue
development after the initial registration, generating
incremental data that further support the drug’s use in
preference to other drugs.
In a delinked model, however, these incentives will
not be present in the same fashion. Oﬀering the same
reward to all newly developed antibiotics would create a
perverse incentive, spurring the development of drugs
that oﬀer the least possible incremental advantage over
existing drugs. Furthermore, there would be no
incentive for development beyond the minimum
requirements. Most fundamentally, the cost of creating
an antibiotic would not necessarily relate to the value of
the drug to patients and society.
The notion of reimbursing for value is generally
attractive, with value deﬁned as incremental improvements in human health.21 In the USA, Medicare and
other payers are experimenting with paying for value in
health care.22 Although this is a theoretically promising
solution, concerns over how the eﬀect of the antibiotic
on health is measured and reimbursed need to be
resolved. This research is underway via DRIVE-AB and
the Innovative Medicines Initiative.

Analogy to the insurance value of ﬁre
prevention and control services
Antibiotics could oﬀer insurance value merely by being
available for use, hence creating an environment
wherein medical care, travel, and commerce can be
conﬁdentially pursued. In this regard, antibiotics and
infection control bear a striking resemblance to the ﬁreﬁghting infrastructure: the microbiology laboratory
serves as the smoke detector, medical personnel are the
ﬁre ﬁghters, and antibiotics are the water supply. All of
these elements have to be established before the ﬁre
(infection), since buildings burn (and patients die) far
more quickly than infrastructure can be built. For
example, an outbreak of plague in India in 199423,24
caused as many as 200 000 people to ﬂee the vicinity and
cost the local economy an estimated $600 million. The

Payments from governments

Expected NPV benchmark at
commencement of R&D

Sertkaya et al11

$919 million (spread over entire R&D
process and at registration; USA only)

$100 million

Sharma and Towse18

$2·5 billion ($500 per year for 5 years)

$300 million

Review on Antimicrobial
Resistance19

$2–4 billion (paid 3 years after registration)

Not stated

All values are in US$. R&D=research and development.

Table 1: Nominal and expected net present value (NPV) estimates of the needed size of antibiotic
delinkage payments

costs of facing a hypothetical pandemic strain of CRE in
London or New York are almost incalculable. The
availability of an eﬀective therapy would doubtless have
reduced the overall level of public anxiety; however, the
insurance value of the drug would have been present
whether or not the actual epidemic had occurred, just as
the ﬁre department is needed even if no ﬁres occur in a
community. Calculations of the insurance value of
antibiotics are in their preliminary stages,25 but the
consequences of not having insurance26,27 should
encourage participation in a worldwide scheme
ensuring antibiotic availability.

Benchmarks for delinked incentives
Delinked incentives should require delivery to market
of a qualiﬁed drug; however, they equally need to
recognise that initial approval is only one step towards
understanding a new drug. The updated regulatory
pathways that permit initial registration with small
datasets in many ways implement an adaptive (or
progressive) licensing approach28 in which initial
registration is presumed to be followed by further
investigations. Thus, delinkage should not be frontloaded at the moment of registration, but instead
spread across the period of time during which clinical
evidence is still being developed.
To address these intertwined issues and in recognition
of calls for research in this specialty (eg, from a 2015
report by the European Parliament29), we discuss a
delinked approach based on a combination of benchmarked payments (table 2). In this proposal, qualifying
novel antibacterial antibiotics receive delinked
reimbursement for a standard term of 5 years beginning
at the time of initial registration. This base amount
would be paid to every qualifying drug via a single
global buyer. The benchmarks provide a dynamic range
by oﬀering additional payments up to four times greater
than the base amount for unambiguous delivery of
features that are more valuable to society. This
benchmark payment is intended to be the net proﬁt
earned by the developer.
The standard base reward amount should be
calculated globally on the basis of reported models,11,18,19
and be suﬃcient to create a reasonably positive NPV for
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Annual payment*
Drug approved at US FDA and European Medicines Agency to treat
at least one deﬁned infection‡ caused by at least one or more
pathogens listed on the CDC 2013 threat assessment as either
urgent, serious, or of concern to public health2

Base payment†

Has a clinical spectrum of activity on the label that includes one or
more urgent pathogens on the CDC 2013 threat assessment§

Bonus equal to one base payment

Has a clinical spectrum of activity on the label that includes one or
more serious pathogens on the CDC 2013 threat assessment§

Bonus equal to 50% of a base payment

Is the ﬁrst approved drug to act via a given mechanism of action¶

Bonus equal to a base payment

Is the second, third, or fourth agent approved to act via a given
mechanism of action

Bonus equal to 75% of a base payment
for a second agent, 50% for a third
agent, or 25% for a fourth agent

Is the ﬁfth or subsequent agent to act via a speciﬁc mechanism of
action but oﬀers a medically relevant improvement in safety,
eﬃcacy, or ease of dosing

Bonus equal to 10% of a base payment

Delivery of agreed paediatric commitment studies||

Payments based on model or separate
contract open to tender

Is approved for a second, third, or fourth deﬁned infection‡ for a
speciﬁc agent||

Bonus equal to 25% of a base payment

Approved in oral dosage form||

Bonus equal to 25% of a base payment

Benchmark payments are paid annually for 5 years from the date the benchmark is ﬁrst met. *Payments are
additive and new drugs can earn various benchmarks. The payment for an oral drug labelled for an urgent
pathogen that has a novel mechanism of action (eg, multidrug-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae) would be 3·25 times
the base amount (one base amount, one bonus for urgent, one bonus for new mechanism of action, and a
0·25 base rate bonus for oral formulation). Additional bonuses could be earned for this drug in subsequent years by
up to three label extensions in other infections, up to 0·75 of a base amount. †All new agents are expected to earn
this payment (it is the minimum bar). ‡Deﬁned infections are aggregated broadly rather than narrowly. §A new
drug can earn one or both of these payments; the payment in each category can only be earned once (coverage of
various urgent pathogens does not earn several payments). ¶Mechanisms of action are deﬁned broadly rather than
narrowly. ||If a benchmark is met as part of the initial drug approval, these benchmark payments will be paid
annually for the full 5-year contract term provided that the sponsor maintains the drug on market. If a benchmark
is met subsequently, payment will be made annually for a full 5-year contract term; however, this additional
payment will start at the date the benchmark was met.

Table 2: Estimated benchmark payments for new antibacterial antibiotics

initial registration for a single indication. Additionally,
the amount should cover the cost of paediatric codevelopment and account for previous public funding.
Further modelling and public debate would be needed
to ensure consensus on the base reward rate, but base
payments around $200 million per year over 5 years
would be consistent with present modelling data. Five
conditions would increase the benchmark payments
over the base amount: novel mechanism of action;
addressing serious unmet medical needs; reducing
health-care costs; targeting priority resistant pathogens;
and post-approval label changes to expand the
indications. Each additional benchmark payment would
be made for 5 years and can start at or after initial
registration.
First, substantial payments might be earned via
discovery and successful development of a drug with a
novel mechanism of action. In this proposal,
mechanisms of action should be construed broadly
rather than narrowly, since otherwise the developer
could argue that slightly diﬀerent points of contact with
a target qualify as a diﬀerent mechanism. For example,
inhibition of a multicomponent enzyme at the same
site as an existing drug (eg, inhibition at the catalytic
502

site of GyrA and ParC, which are blocked by the
ﬂuoroquinolones) would not qualify as a new class of
antibiotic, but inhibition at an entirely new location on
these large molecules (eg, the ATP binding site of GyrB
and ParE) would qualify. A public consensus led by a
respected neutral body would probably be needed to
delineate how new mechanisms of action and
antibiotics withdrawn from the market are classiﬁed
(eg, whether novobiocin, which is no longer marketed,
is a previous example of an inhibitor of the ATP binding
site of GyrB and ParE).30
Second, although the full payment for a novel
mechanism cannot be earned by subsequent class
entrants, substantial payments should be oﬀered to
subsequent entrants solving problems such as toxic
eﬀects, dosing, and eﬃcacy. This method deliberately
encourages the development of improved drugs within
a new class, since they provide substantial societal
value.31
Third, additional benchmark payments should be
made for reducing overall health system costs, such as
oral administration of a drug, and adding value to
society generally. Oral administration oﬀers a substantial beneﬁt to the overall health-care system by
reducing the complexity of administration and by
facilitating step-down and outpatient treatment.
Furthermore, oral administration can promote access
in resource-constrained populations.
Fourth, the development of drugs that target priority
pathogens selected through a global threat assessment,
similar to the one done in the USA by the CDC, should
result in additional benchmark payments.2 In the CDC
threat assessment,2 resistant pathogens were triaged
through an expert assessment into three categories:
urgent, serious, and concerning. Higher payments
would be made for drugs that target pathogens in the
urgent category and a lesser amount for those in the
serious category. No additional payments would be
awarded for the concerning category, since that is the
baseline for entering the delinked reward structure.
Finally, additional payments should be made after
further clinical studies that expand the drug’s label to
include new indications. These payments will provide an
incentive for developers to pursue further study after
initial registration. The developer should receive a suitable
reward for the eﬀort even if it cannot be part of the initial
registration. Distinct indications could include community-acquired bacterial pneumonia, hospital-associated
or ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia, complicated
and uncomplicated urinary tract infection, complicated
intra-abdominal infection, acute bacterial skin and skin
structure infection, endocarditis, meningitis, osteomyelitis, infectious arthritis, uncomplicated sexually
transmitted diseases, and the Unmet Need indication
proposed by the European Medicines Agency.
Similar to incentives pertaining to the mechanism of
action, it will be important to avoid the distorted
www.thelancet.com/infection Vol 16 April 2016

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755033

Personal View

incentives that might ensue if indications are too
narrowly divided. Hence, ﬁne distinctions should not
be drawn (eg, uncomplicated cervical, anal, uretheral,
and oropharyngeal gonorrhoea would not qualify as
four forms of uncomplicated gonorrhoea). Again,
public consensus on deﬁned indications would
probably be needed.
Implementation of such a scheme has to consider
the perspective of the companies investing in new
agents. First, the values assigned to the benchmarks
should be modelled against expected company
investment and public beneﬁt. They need to be robust
enough to encourage companies, but not so large that
society does not obtain excellent value. For example, if
society expects a company to invest $93 million in
post-approval phase 4 studies over a 5-year period, then
the expected NPV of these studies should be positive
based on the models. By one model, the necessary
reward for this scenario is $70 million per year, paid
over the following 5 years.18 This reward is surprisingly
large because of the assumption of an 11% discount
rate. Alternatively, post-registration research undertaken under contract with no connection to delinkage
payments might be more eﬃcient. Risk of failure is
lower in post-approval studies and the research could
be completed without the ﬁnancial eﬀects of
discounting.
Second, low-cost worldwide access should be assured
without patent-based mark-ups. The developer should
not receive proﬁt based on usage, and promotional
activities should be eliminated. On the basis of
projected and actual health needs, the developer will
need to produce and make available via standard supply
chains the needed volumes during the contract period.
The net global price will be the audited marginal cost of
production (including appropriate overheads to
maintain the supply chain and address pharmacovigilance). To avoid incentives that could result from
users perceiving a particular drug to be cheap, it might
be necessary for the drug to have a price similar to that
of other drugs already on the market and locally
accessible. Thus, usage would be guided by medical
need combined with good stewardship practice. The
diﬀerence between the audited marginal cost and the
price paid by the user could be rebated to the global
purchasing facility.
Third, antibiotic research and development is a
worldwide issue that cannot be solved by any nation
alone.32 We propose an integrated worldwide reimbursement model with proportional ﬁnancial
contributions from, at the very least, members of the
G20 (which includes Brazil, China, India, Russia, and
South Africa). Broader participation can occur over
time and a global institution would be needed to
coordinate such a venture. Models include GAVI, MMV
(Medicines for Malaria Venture), and the Medicines
Patent Pool. The institution will require the ability to
www.thelancet.com/infection Vol 16 April 2016

contract with companies and enjoy stable funding from
the USA, European Union, and other G20 governments.
Alternatively, the USA and European Union could
independently pursue delinked reimbursement
programmes that are coordinated to align the basic
incentives towards a common set of goals.33,34

Limitations and further questions
This proposal has many limitations and questions for
further study (panel). The benchmark payment values
in table 2 need to be modelled on the basis of audited
parameters and agreed by many stakeholders. Stable
funding will be needed, with incremental worldwide
funding in the range of $2–4 billion per year. However,
since the worldwide antibiotic market is roughly
$40 billion per year, investments of this magnitude are
quite reasonable to preserve this life-saving class of
drugs.35 Creation of a suitable worldwide authority to
implement this fund is another obvious constraint, in
addition to the problem of free riders on the system and
the absence of an incentive to reduce production
costs.33,34
Delinkage should guarantee maintenance of
antibiotics after all reward payouts are completed. This
can be partly addressed by making on-market maintenance a condition of receiving any reward payment.
Since at least some of the reward payments are likely to
be staggered (additional label-extending indication
studies can take up to 2–4 years), individual drugs
might be supported by remaining payments for up to a
decade. However, longer-term maintenance is desirable
and this would entail at least some ongoing contractual
maintenance arrangements. Providing a steadily
reducing percentage of the total earned reward for a
further period of time should be considered, with the
percentage falling to zero at a point corresponding
roughly to the typical term of marketing exclusivity.

Panel: Next steps
The following steps are crucial to making a model delinked
from sales a reality:
• Further modelling of the magnitude of payments needed
to create an appropriate incentive, with such modelling to
identify ways to account for previous government
support
• Further modelling of the insurance value of antibiotics
• Consensus on the deﬁnition of a novel mechanism
• Consensus on the distinct indications that would earn a
benchmarked payment
• Building commitment from the G20 countries for
long-term support
• Creation of a global facility to manage the delinked
purchase process
• Agreement on a process for drugs reaching the end of
their benchmarked payment period

503
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Drug production over a very long period of time could
be contracted to the developer or others willing to
undertake the tasks.
A further risk is that some investors might view a
deﬁned, ﬁxed reward as contrary to the high risk–high
reward model of the biotechnology industry. However,
our view is that the present market model for antibiotics
is high risk–low reward and that most investors would
be pleased to have a predictable return on investment.

10

Conclusion

13

We need new antibiotics that have the greatest societal
value. Delinked payments can be designed with a base
payment linked to the registration of a new qualifying
antibiotic and a set of incremental benchmark payments earned by demonstration of speciﬁc properties
of the new drug. The strength of this proposal comes
from the simplicity of benchmarks and their direct
linkage to features oﬀering societal value. The scheme
encourages novel drugs, foresees the need for multiple
drugs in a class, and encourages continuing work after
initial registration.
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